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Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence and Expert Testimony:
One Potato, Two Potato, Daubert, Frye
Maryland Judicial Institute
September 23, 2009
Lynn McLain
University of Baltimore School of Law
The goal of scientific research is to increase our knowledge. As knowledge grows,
previously well-accepted theories are cast off and replaced by new theories, which in time may
be refined or rejected. Though the world was once believed to be flat, we believe it to be rather
round today. Newton's discovery of gravity still holds, so far. ...
Expert testimony has been admitted in America since the 1600's; for example, a Dr.
Brown gave "'scientific'" testimony at a heresy trial that the defendant had "bewitched" several
persons. 1 How should trial judges filter which scientific and other expert evidence is admissible?

The applicable Maryland Rules, found in Title 5, are essentially the same as the corollary
Federal Rules of Evidence? The most salient difference in their application is that the Court of
Appeals of Maryland continues to apply the "general acceptance" Frye-Reed standard to the
admission of novel scientific evidence, while the federal courts, under Daubert ("Dow-burt") and
its progeny use the Frye standard, when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, as
only one of several factors in a more flexible test evaluating relevance, reliability, and the relative
helpfulness of all expert testimony (a Rules 401-702-403 test). This Rules 5-401-5-702-5-403
test is applicable in Maryland to all expert testimony not covered by Frye-Reed.
In either state or federal court, the first inquiry when any expert testimony is offered is, as
with all evidence, is it relevant to the case?

I Andre A. Moenssens & Fred E. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases § 1.02 at 4
(2d ed. 1978) (citing Howell, State Trials 687 (1665)).
2 This is especially true since Fed. R. Evid. 703 was amended in 2000 to follow an
approach like that adopted in Md. Rule 5-703 in 1994.
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I.

Overview of Rules Analysis: 5-401 Relevance/Other Rules/5-403 Discretion
1.

Is the evidence relevant (does it have even
a slight tendency to prove or disprove a
fact that is of consequence to the case,
Md. Rule 5-401)?

~

~

No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-402.

Yes.

~
2.

Is the evidence excluded by constitution,
statute, specific rule in Title 5 of the
Md. Rules, or case law not inconsistent
with Title 5?

~

Yes. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-402.

~

Yes. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-403.

~
No.

~
3.

Should the trial court in its discretion
exclude the evidence anyway, because
the danger of its (1) causing unfair
prejudice, or (2) confusing or misleading
the jury, or (3) consuming too much time,
substantially outweighs the probative
value it adds to the case?

~
No.
Admissible.

As always, "the devil is in the details." Here the "details" are in Step 2 above: all the
Rules except 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403!
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II.

Lay Witness or Expert?
Is the witness a lay witness, an expert but a "fact witness," or an expert witness for
purposes of the discovery rules and the evidence rules?

A.

Is the witness neither shown to be qualified as an
expert "by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education," nor testifying based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge? ---.~ No, treat as expert.
See ll.B.2, Ill.-V.

Yes, a lay witness. Md. Rule 5-701 applies.

Is tbe Jtness testifying either to bis or ber opinion
or to an inference he or she has made?

Yes.

(1)

Is the opinion or inference (a) rationally
based (b) on first-hand knowledge of
the witness?
-----:.~ No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-701(1)

Yes.

(2)

Will the opinion or inference help the
fact-finder either (a) understand the
witness's testimony or (b) determine a
fact at issue in the case?
---.~ No. Jury is in just as
good a position to form
an opinion as the
witness is.
Inadmissible.
Yes.
Md.
Rule 5-701(2).
Admissible (subject to Md.
3

Rule 5-403).
Note: These determinations as to
admissibility are all by the trial
judge under Md. Rule 5-104(a).

Testimony must be to
"Just the facts, ma'am."

See vol. 6 LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§
701:1-701:7 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) (accessible on Westlaw as, e.g., "6
Maryland Evidence 701:1 "); JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE
HANDBOOK §§ 603-603(F) (2d ed. 1999) (accessible on LEXIS by clicking on
"Find a Source" and typing in "Maryland Evidence Handbook").

B.

Witnesses with specialized knowledge may be called to testify either as fact
witnesses or expert witnesses.
1.

Fact witnesses testify from first-hand knowledge to relevant facts in
the case, and do not give expert opinions. For example, if an arresting
officer testifies to what he or she observed, the officer is merely a fact
witness and Md. Rule 5-701 applies.
A fact witness may not testify to facts of which the witness has
first-hand knowledge and then opine as to them - based on the witness's
expertise gained from "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, or
education" - unless there has been compliance with the discovery rules
regarding expert testimony. Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609
(2005). But see Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 544, 890 A.2d 288 (2006)
(declining to apply Ragland holding to the testimony of a police officer in
a suppression hearing).

2.

Expert witnesses may testify to their opinions, but are subject to
special discovery and evidence rules.
If the arresting officer testifies, for example, that the defendant
swallowed "crack cocaine," rather than "something that looked like crack
cocaine," the line has been crossed. Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 11528, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997).

3.

Necessity for expert testimony
Sometimes expert testimony is required in order for a party to meet
its burden of production of evidence so as to survive a motion for
summary judgment or a directed verdict against it. E.g., Wood v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 134 Md. App. 512, 760 A.2d 315 (2000). See vol. 5 McLain
§ 300:7; Murphy §§ 1401-1402. Such an expert's opinion generally must
4

be given to at least "a reasonable degree of probability." See, e.g., Impala
Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 333, 389 A.2d
887,908 (1978) (expert witness's appraisal of present value oflost profits
was within guidelines of reasonable certainty rule and was properly
admitted in evidence).

"[W]here a complex and novel theory of science has been
postulated," the Court of Appeals has held that the courts ought look
especially closely at admissibility, especially where "the area of
expertise is central to the resolution of the lawsuit." Blackwell v.
Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,627-29,971 A.2d 235 (2009) (affirming trial court's
exclusion of plaintiffs , proffered experts - (1) a medical doctor and a
genetic counselor, (2) a chemistry professor, (3) a pharmacology professor,
(4) a pediatrician, and (5) a forensic psychiatrist, as unqualified to testify
to epidemiological matters: a causal link between a mercury derivative in
vaccines given to an infant and his autism and mental retardation).
Questions
1.

Police officer on narcotics squad is called to testify at trial that, based on his training and
experience, what he observed: two telephone calls from separate pay phones, the
movements of two vehicles, and something passing between them - was a drug
transaction. This is:
A.

Lay testimony.

B.

Expert testimony.

Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005).
2.

A witness, a licensed driver who was on the highway at the time in question, testifies that
she saw the civil defendant in an automobile tort case driving down the highway "at a
very high rate of speed, tailgating, and weaving in and out of traffic." The evidence is:
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321,339-40,368 A.2d 1005 (1977); Lilly v. State, 212
Md. 436, 444, 129 A.2d 839 (1957).
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3.

The same witness testifies that the defendant was "at least negligent and I think grossly
negligent. He scared me to death." The evidence is:
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

See Baltimore v. C&O Ry. v. Moon, 118 Md. 380,391-92,84 A. 536 (1912); McCoy v.
Hatmaker, 135 Md. App. 693, 720-23, 763 A.2d 1283 (2000).
4.

A buddy is called to testify that when he saw the DUI defendant leave the bar, the
defendant was drunk.
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

Crampton v. State, 71 Md. App. 375, 388, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987), aff'd on other grounds,
314 Md. 265, 550 A.2d 693 (1998).
5.

Police officer is asked by the prosecutor whether the officer believes the defendant is
guilty. The evidence is:
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

Crawfordv. State, 285 Md. 431, 404 A.2d 244 (1979).
6.

Arresting police officer's testimony that he smelled marijuana smoke is:
A.

Admissible lay opinion, as long as witness is familiar with the smell of marijuana
through past experience.

B.

Inadmissible unless officer is qualified as an expert.

In re Ondrel M, 173 Md. App. 223, 228 &
III.

llll.

5-6,238-45,918 A.2d 543 (2007).

Expert Witnesses: Overview

If expert witness testimony is offered, it may be admitted if the court finds that it would
be helpful to the trier of fact, which determination is based on three criteria under Md.
Rule 5-702:
6

1.

Is the subject matter of the testimony
appropriate?
------i.~ No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(2).

1

Yes.

2.

1

Is the particular witness qualified to
---l.~
testify on this subject?

1

No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(1).

Yes.

3.

1

Is there a sufficient factual basis,
in the case, to support the expert
testimony?

1

------i.~

No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(3).

Yes.
Admissible (subject to Md. Rule 5-403)

4.

What is the form that expert testimony may take?
Fonn of testimony may be by opinion (Md. Rule 5-702), and the
expert is not required to have first-hand knowledge ofthe underlying facts
(Md. Rules 5-602 and 5-703). The fact that the opinion goes to an
ultimate issue in the case does not necessarily exclude it, Md. Rule 5-704.
The question generally remains whether the particular opinion will
assist the trier offact, rather than be superfluous, unnecessary, or
confusing. Md. Rule 5-702.

See, e.g., Charles H. Steffey, Inc. v. High, 216 Md. 170, 173-74,
139 A.2d 730 (1958) ("[AJ person who is qualified by study or experience,
or both, to understand and explain the subject under consideration, may
testify as to the manner in which a certain device or appliance operates.
The test of admissibility of such testimony is whether it would probably
aid the trier of fact to draw an accurate conclusion ... from the facts
7

already in evidence"; State Roads employee was properly permitted to
testify to operation of three phase traffic signal).

In criminal cases, there is a special caveat: experts permitted by
statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-120, may testify on an
ultimate issue of sanity ("criminal responsibility") but otherwise may not
state an opinion as to whether the defendant had a mental state or
condition necessary for the charged crime. Md. Rule 5-704(b).
5.

Must the expert first give a detailed basis for his or her opinion?
The court may permit the expert to testify to his or her opinion, and
"reasons" for it, "without first testifying to the underlying facts or data,"
Md. Rule 5-705, as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient
factual basis for the opinion. Md. Rule 5-702(3). (lfthe court has doubts
on that point, it may require the expert to first testify to the underlying
facts or data. Md. Rule 5-705.)

6.

What if the underlying facts are inadmissible in evidence?
The expert may base his or her opinion on otherwise inadmissible
hearsay, as long as it is shown to be "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field informing opinions or inferences on the
subject. ... " Md. Rule 5-703(a).

1
1

Did the expert rely on otherwise
inadmissible hearsay?

Yes.

Was it of a type reasonably relied on by experts
in that field? (The court may require disclosure
of that hearsay basis outside the hearing of the
jury, see Md. Rule 5-1 04(c) (court "shall" do so
when "the interests of justice" so require), so that
the court may rule, under Md. Rule 5-1 04(a), on
the admissibility of the opinion under Md.
Rule 5-702.).
_ _-... No. Opinion
inadmissible.

1
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Yes.
Opinion admissible (subject to
Md. Rule 5-403, and in criminal
cases, subject to the accused's
confrontation right).

7.

Should an otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis be admitted on direct
examination for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's
opinion?
If the court finds that such basis is "[i] trustworthy, [ii] necessary to
illuminate testimony, and [iii] unprivileged," then it has the discretion to
pennit disclosure to the jury on direct. If it does so, then, upon request, the
court shall give a limiting instruction to the jury "to use those facts and
data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of
the expert's opinion or inference." Md. Rules 5-703(b); 5-105.
Regardless of whether the court pennits such disclosure on direct,
the opponent may freely cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of
his or her opinion. Md. Rule 5-703(c).

See generally 6 McLain §§ 702:1-705:1; Murphy §§
1404-1404(B)(I), 1407-1408(A).
IV.

Qualifications of the Particular Witness as an Expert
Is the witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education," in the area as to which
the proponent offers the witness as an expert?
•

1

No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(1).

Yes.

See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 223-25, 969 A.2d 262 (2009) (expert was
qualified to testify about canine police work, but not about percentage of paper money
that contains traces of illicit drugs).
Trial judge decides this question under Md. Rule 5-1 04( a). Standard of appellate
review: abuse of discretion, except that when standards for particular experts are
established by statute, the trial court may not exclude such experts on the ground
that they are unqualified. See In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md.
634,647, 759 A.2d 755 (2000) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in pennitting a
9

certified clinical social worker to testify as to mental disorders; fact that a statute, Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-120, expressly authorizes licensed psychologists to
testify "merely limits the court's discretion to deny a person in that class expert status for
the purpose of testifying. When no such statute exists with regard to a person offered as
an expert, however, the court has broad discretion to determine whether that person will
be qualified as an expert or not.") (citation omitted).

See generally 6 McLain § 702:4; Murphy §§ 602(B)(1), 1403-1403(A).

Question
7.

An M.D. who practices internal medicine may not, as a matter of law, testify to his or her
expert opinion as to gynecology.

A.

Correct.

B.

Incorrect.

See Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173,367 A.2d 472 (1977). Compare Ralston v.
Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 968-70 (10th Cir. 2001) (because
proffered testimony must pass Daubert analysis, mere possession of medical degree does
not qualify a physician to testify concerning any medical-related issue).

v.

Appropriateness of the Subject Matter of, and Sufficiency of Factual Basis for,
Expert Opinion
A.

Overview: Helpfulness, Required Basis, and Reliability
Will the jury be in just as good a position to
form an opinion as an expert would be?
---~. Yes. Expert opinion on
that topic is inadmissible. The witness must
"back up," either to an
opinion that would be
No.
helpful, or all the way
to the facts. Md. Rules
5-702 and 5-704.
Is there a sufficient factual basis in the
admissible evidence to make the expert
opinion relevant to the case?
---~. No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rule 5-702(3).

1
1

1
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•

Yes.

1

Is the expert opinion supported sufficiently,
both by its factual basis and in its
------:~~
methodology, to be reliable?

Is the underlying theory, method, or
technique sound in principle?

Yes. ALiSSible.
E.g., radar, Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 10-301;
DNA, id.§ 10-915(c);
blood tests in
paternity
proceedings, see Md.
Code Ann., Fam.
Law § 5-1028.

No. Inadmissible.

~~ ~~~_~~ Rule 5-702(1).

/
Alternative 1:
Has it been
recognized by
statute?

---~~

No. Inadmissible.
Md. Rules 5-702(1) &
(3) and 5-703.

Alternative 2:
Is it the proper
subject of judicial

notice?

Alternative 3:
If Frye-Reed applies,
has it been generally
accepted by scientists
in the relevant field?

1

Yes. Admissible.
Md. Rule 5-201. See,
e.g., Faya v.
Almaraz, 329 Md.
435,444-47,620
A.2d 327 (1993)
(facts regarding HN
and AIDS); Reed v.
State, 283 Md. 374,
380,391 A.2d 364
(1978) ("ballistics
tests, fingerprint
identification, blood
tests, and the like")
(dictum).

Yes. AJissible.
See V.B.1-2 & 4

Alternative 4:
If Frye-Reed is
inapplicable, is the
expert opinion
relevant-reliable-and
not unduly
prejudicial or timeconsummg; as
determined under a
Daubert-type, Md.
Rules 5-401/5-702/5403 anariS?
Yes. Admissible.
See V.B.3-4

See generally 5 McLain §§ 401:4 & 401:8; 6 McLain §§ 702:2-702:3; Murphy §§ 1406-1406(C).
Once a scientific principle is statutorily approved, judicially noticed, or found to meet the
Frye-Reed standard, the results of the tests that rely on that principle will be admitted if three
more prerequisites are met:

11

.

.
1.

Any equipment necessary for perfonning the test was in working order;

2.

The person operating the equipment or perfonning the test was qualified to do so;
and

3.

That person did so properly.

Questions

8.

A psychiatrist who interviewed the victim and has written extensively on child abuse is
asked whether he believes the alleged sexual abuse victim's testimony. The evidence is:
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

See Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277,539 A.2d 657 (1988).
9.

A police officer with significant training and experience in law enforcement regarding
illicit drugs is called by the State to testify as to the street value of recovered drugs, how
much an addict would purchase at a time, and that the amount of drugs was not for
personal consumption.
A.

Admissible in the court's discretion.

B.

Inadmissible as a matter oflaw.

See Smiley v. State, 138 Md. App. 709, 719, 773 A.2d 606 (2001).
10.

The accused has pled not criminally responsible. He calls a psychiatrist to testify that,
based on his interview with the murder defendant, the defendant panicked when a robbery
did not go as he planned and that he did not have the intent to murder.
A.

Admissible

B.

Inadmissible.

Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 611 A.2d 581 (1992).

12

..
11.

In the same case, the defense psychiatrist is called to testify to the defendant's
"psychological profile," that he was under a tremendous amount of stress from his father.
The defendant had not testified to (nor admitted other testimony to) his mental state. The
trial judge excluded the evidence.
A.

Abuse of discretion to exclude.

B.

No abuse of discretion to exclude.

Hartless, 327 Md. at 574-81; Waltermeyer v. State, 60 Md. App. 69,480 A.2d 831
(1984). See State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 233, 844 A.2d 429 (2004); Beatty v. Trailmaster
Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993).
12.

Psychiatrist testifies that murder defendant has a mental disorder, because he has
experienced an amnesic episode. The opinion is:
A.

Admissible.

B.

Inadmissible.

Evans v. State, 322 Md. 24, 585 A.2d 204 (1991).
See Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455,497-509,897 A.2d 821 (2006) (medical examiner's
testimony had sufficient factual basis, including her microscopic examination of slides,
her predecessor's findings as to the physical condition of the victim, the findings of the
M.E.'s investigator, and the police reports); City of Frederick v. Shankle, 367 Md. 5, 1516, 785 A.2d 749 (2001) (expert cannot testify in contradiction oflegislative presumption
that jury must consider, underlying police and firefighters workers' compensation
statute); Franch v. Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 361-65, 670 A.2d 951 (1996) (no error in
striking experts' testimony as lacking sufficient basis).
B.

Reliability, Absent Statutory Recognition of Judicial Notice

1.

Frye-Reed Still Good Law in Maryland
In a four-to-three decision in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d
364 (1978), the Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of "voiceprint"
evidence on the ground that it was not generally accepted in the scientific
community. Judge Eldridge, writing for the majority, supported the court's
decision to adopt the Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
test on the following grounds:

13

(1) To admit evidence on which the scientific community
disagrees would invite a confusing, time-consuming battle of the
experts in each trial;
(2) Such a battle would require the fact finder to resolve a
dispute which even the relevant scientific community could not
resolve;
(3) Inconsistent results would no doubt occur;
(4) Those could cause verdicts at odds with each other,
solely because one fact-finder gave credence to a scientific
principle and another did not, when, in fact, the principle was
either universally true or not; and
(5) The fact-finder might be tempted to give undue weight
to any so-called "scientific" evidence. This temptation might be
especially great when the scientific evidence, like that of the
voiceprint in Reed, is offered scientifically to identify the
perpetrator of the crime for which the defendant is being tried.
In light of the desire for consistency, there is no presumption of
correctness of a trial court's finding of general acceptance under the
Frye-Reed standard; the question on appeal is merely whether the trial
court's finding is "against the weight of the evidence rather than whether it
is clearly erroneous." Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233, 239, 533 A.2d
944 (1987). In reviewing the trial court's decision, "the appellate court
may consider evidence which was not presented to the trial court." !d.
Judge Smith, joined by Chief Judge Robert Murphy and Judge
Orth, dissented in Reed. The dissenters would have admitted the
voiceprint evidence and let any dispute about its validity go to its weight.
In an approach prescient of Daubert, they argued that the court should
require only that scientific evidence have "reasonable reliability," rather
than general acceptance. The dissent argued:
(1) Maryland had not followed the 1923 Frye case before
1978;
(2) The Frye standard would exclude a great deal of
probative scientific evidence; its application might cause the
judicial system to lag years or decades behind scientific advances;

14

(3) The Frye standard developed in a case involving
polygraphs, which pose special problems;
(4) Courts admit much evidence that is of questionable
reliability, including eyewitness testimony and voice identifications
by lay witnesses, without imposing such a high standard;
(5) The Frye standard does not give juries enough credit for
being able to weigh scientific evidence, which can be attacked on
cross-examination; and
(6) The Frye standard is unclear about how the proof it
requires may be produced. For example, there can be a problem in
the determination of what is the relevant scientific community
under Frye. Those who study a new field - such as voiceprints and are in its forefront are sometimes discredited by the courts as
having too much of a personal stake in the process' validity. But
those in related fields - such as physiology, anatomy, and
acoustical sciences - may be unlikely to know enough to make an
informed judgment.
When it adopted Title 5, the Court of Appeals left to development
through the case law whether it would continue to adhere to Frye-Reed or
whether it might jettison that standard in favor of the then recent Daubert
approach. Md. Rule 5-702, Committee Note. Since then it has reaffirmed
its loyalty to Frye. E.g., Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575,971 A.2d 235
(2009). Maryland is not alone in its fealty to Frye. Several other states,
including Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington, have reaffinned
Frye post-Daubert. 3
The Court of Appeals has explained the application of Frye as
follows:
A trial court may take judicial notice of the reliability of
scientific techniques and methodologies that are widely
accepted within the scientific community. A trial court also
may take notice that certain scientific theories are viewed as
unreliable, bogus, or experimental. However, when it is
unclear whether the scientific community accepts the scientific

But see Note, Codifying Expert Testimony in Maryland Rules 5-702 and 5-703: Why
Traditional AnalysiS Should be Generally Acceptable, 54 MD. L. REv. 1085 (1995) (urging
Maryland's adoption of Daubert approach).
3
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theory or methodology, we have noted that before testimony
based on the questioned technique may be admitted into
evidence, the reliability must be demonstrated. While the most
common practice will include witness testimony, a court may take
judicial notice of journal articles from reliable sources and other
publications which may shed light on the degree of acceptance vel
non [or not] by recognized experts of a particular process or view.
The opinion of an "expert" witness should be admitted only if
the court finds that "the basis of the opinion is generally
accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific
field."
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 327, 923 A.2d 939
(2007) (citations omitted).

But the continued allegiance to Frye does not end the inquiry. Maryland's
appellate courts have not applied Frye-Reed to all expert testimony, or
even to all scientific evidence.
2.

The $64,000 Question: When Does Frye Apply?
a.

Frye-Reed Applies to the Validity of Scientific Theories, Tests,
and Techniques

A Frye-Reed showing must be made as to evidence
based on a "novel theory of science," Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408
Md. at 627, or a "novel scientific method." Montgomery Mut.
Ins. Co., 399 Md. at 327 ("Under the Frye-Reed test, a party must
establish first that any novel scientific method is reliable and
accepted generally in the scientific community before the court will
admit expert testimony based upon the application of the
questioned scientific technique.").4
i.

If the theory or method underlying an expert's opinion
has been generally accepted, see State v. Baby, 404 Md.
220, 266-71, 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (the testimony regarding
"rape trauma syndrome" must pass the Frye-Reed test as to
the reliability of the underlying theory); Montgomery Mut.
Ins. Co., 399 Md. at 326-34 (remanding for a Frye-Reed

But see Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. at 577 n.1 (overstating the proposition as "FryeReed is the test in Maryland for determining whether expert testimony is admissible.").
4
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hearing, to be held before trial and outside the presence of
the jury; if plaintiff s doctor expert witness's testimony,
"based on scientific opinion regarding the causal link
between mold exposure and sick building syndrome" does
not satisfy Frye-Reed, the judgment must be vacated), then
the opinion itself need not meet that test: experts may
testify to different opinions. Giddens v. State, 148 Md.
App. 407,415-17,812 A.2d 1075 (2002) ("The Frye-Reed
test applies to methodologies, not the conclusions drawn
from applying the methodologies. ... ... It is ... well
settled ... that if the relevant scientific community is in
general agreement that a properly conducted scientific test
will produce an accurate result, the Frye-Reed test does not
operate to exclude conflicting expert opinions based upon
such a test. Because expert pathologists do agree that a
properly conducted autopsy will reveal lack of swelling in
the victim's brain and spinal cord, nothing in Frye, Reed or
Wilson requires the exclusion of Dr. Pestaner's 'time of
injury' opinion based upon that autopsy finding."); Owens
Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 726 A.2d 745
(1999) (trial court property permitted pulmonary
pathologist to testify; Frye-Reed test did not apply to his
testimony, which was not based on novel techniques or
tests), as modified on clarification, (Apr. 7, 1999).
ii.

But the court must conduct a Frye-Reed hearing if the
expert is proposing a novel theory, even one based on
his or her own observations, experience, and study.
In Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575 (2009), the
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that their child's autism and
mental retardation were caused by vaccinations containing
the preservative thimerosal (an ethyl mercury derivative)
that he received as an infant. Circuit Court Judge Berger
entered summary judgment for the defendants upon
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their
experts' opinions as to causation, and the underlying
analysis, met Frye-Reed. The Court of Appeals, in an
extensive, unanimous opinion by Judge Battaglia, affirmed.
It reviewed (1) de novo the legal question of
admissibility under Frye-Reed, and (2) the exclusion of
the plaintiffs' experts as unqualified, under the more
deferential standard of abuse of discretion.
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Judge Battaglia characterized the first question as
involving "the application of the Frye-Reed test to the
analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data
and methods of gathering this data are generally accepted in
the scientific community but applied to support a novel
theory." She reviewed numerous well-respected studies
which Circuit Court Judge Berger had reviewed, that had
concluded that the scientific evidence to date shows no link
between thimerosal and autism.
The plaintiffs' principal expert and his son had
conducted the only studies showing such a link "in a small
number of genetically susceptible individuals." But the
methodology of their studies had been criticized by the
American Academy of Pediatrics and the National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine. In
reevaluating the trial court's resolution of the Frye-Reed
issue, the Court of Appeals explicitly borrowed from the
"reliability" analysis of the federal courts (although the
federal courts had applied Daubert). Following their
reasoning, the Maryland court held that "[g]eneraUy
accepted methodology must be coupled with generally
accepted analysis," so that expert opinion based on "
'too great a leap' " must be excluded.
b.

Lack of Uniformity; Some Earlier Language Has Been
Rejected
When to apply Frye has proved troublesome for every Frye
jurisdiction, and no clear, uniform standard has emerged. See, e.g.,
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000) (vacating trial
court's order excluding plaintiffs expert's testimony regarding
sexual abuse victim's repressed memory; Frye is inapplicable: "
'Although compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist
reaches a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process
based on the work or discovery of others, under Rules 702 and 703
experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and
observation and opinions based on their own work without first
showing general acceptance. Such evidence need only meet the
traditional requirements of relevance and avoid substantial
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.' "). Compare Marsh v.
Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (Frye does not
apply to a medical expert's "pure opinion" testimony regarding
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causal link between trauma and fibromyalgia, but even if Frye did
apply, it was satisfied by the testifying expert) with, e.g., Ramirez
v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2001) (procedure for identification of
knife marks failed Frye test).
Maryland's Court of Appeals decisions in Blackwell v.
Wyeth and Montgomery Mutual Ins. Co. attempt to resolve
confusion engendered by earlier appellate decisions, most notably
State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89,98,517 A.2d 741 (1986), where the
Court of Appeals held that Frye-Reed did not apply to the
admissibility of expert testimony that an alleged rape victim
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), when offered
to rebut a defense of consent. The Allewalt majority states:
The analysis by the Court of Special Appeals erects an
unreasonably high standard for the admissibility of medical
opinion evidence. The analysis also mischaracterizes the
evidence in this case as if the medical opinion had been
presented as a scientific test the results of which were
controlled by inexorably physical laws. Further, the
analysis ignores [the psychiatrist's] opinion that, based on
the history [given him by the victim], the stressor causing
PTSD in [the victim] following June 25, 1983, was what
she said was a rape occurring on that day.
Allewalt was followed by Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md. App.
442,594 A.2d 1248 (1991), where the Court of Special Appeals
held that the trial court committed reversible error in applying the
Frye-Reed standard to a doctor's opinion testimony as to how
asbestos directly causes cancer. The appellate court held that the
doctor should have been permitted to testifY, when he testified his
opinion rose to a "reasonable medical probability," "even though
he could not state that the theory he espoused was generally
accepted by the medical community." It reasoned that the Frye
doctrine did not apply, because the doctor was not testifYing as to
"the validity of a new scientific technique" such as lie detector
tests, breathalyzer tests, or paraffin tests. Myers relied on Allewalt
to hold that Frye-Reed does not extend" 'to medical opinion
evidence which is not presented as a scientific test the results of
which were controlled by inexorable, physical laws. ' "

Again, in CSXv. Miller, 159 Md. App. 123,858 A.2d 1025
(2004) the Court of Special Appeals relied on Myers to find Frye19

Reed inapplicable to a medical opinion regarding the etiology of a
workers' compensation claimant's osteoarthritis.
In Montgomery Mutual Ins. Co., Judge Raker distinguished
Allewalt, CSX, and Myers from the case before the court:
The instant case differs from both CSX and Myers. It
involves more than a generally accepted medical opinion
and diagnosis. Dr. Shoemaker employs medical tests to
reach a conclusion [regarding toxic mold and sick building
syndrome] that is not so widely accepted as to be subject to
judicial notice of reliability. Further, as we noted in Reed,
novel medical theories regarding the causes of medical
conditions have been subject to Frye analysis. Reed, 283
Md. At 383,391 A.2d at 369 (noting that the Frye test had
been applied to "medical testimony regarding the cause of
birth defects").
399 Md. At 332-33 (footnote omitted). She pointed out that in
Allewalt there was " 'no issue ... over the fact that psychiatrists
and psychologists recognize PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder]
as an anxiety disorder.' " Id. At 332. Judge Battaglia, writing for
the court in Blackwell v. Wyeth, reiterated this distinction.

The language in Allewalt regarding Frye-Reed has been
distinguished to extinction.
c.

Other Maryland Cases Regarding Application of Frye-Reed
i.

Brands of Devices Used to Apply Established Principles,
No
Frye-Reed was held inapplicable to the accuracy of
particular products or devices used to apply established
scientific principles. Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 573,
664 A.2d 375 (1995). The defense "conceded that the use
oflasers to measure speed is generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community." The Court of Appeals held
that the design of the particular gun used to measure speed
of defendant's motor vehicle - rather than the underlying
theory - was not subject to Frye-Reed.

ii.

DNA Evidence: RFLP, No; PCR, Yes
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(a)

RFLP (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism)
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1091S(c) makes DNA evidence collected using the
RFLP technique admissible, so that generalized
challenges to its admissibility are precluded.
Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221
(1996) (over dissent of Bell, J.). The statute also
makes admissible expert testimony to statistics
showing the odds of a random match (in Armstead,
1 in 480,000,000 and 1 in 800,000, respectively),
under either the "product rule" or the "ceiling
principle" method. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 132
Md. App. 510, 523, 752 A.2d 1250 (2000).5
RFLP DNA evidence may be excluded only
if it is irrelevant, or if case-specific defects in the
testing procedure make particular results unhelpful.
The trial judge must permit the defense to crossexamine a State's DNA expert about testing errors
and incidents of contamination at the lab in
question. Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 744-52,
679 A.2d 1106 (1996) (reversible error to restrict
that line of questioning).
The statute does not preclude a trial
judge from excluding evidence of a DNA profile
if the court concludes that the laboratory in
question did not follow proper procedures, so
that the test results are unhelpful. A procedure
like the following, endorsed by several federal
courts of appeals, seems appropriate (except that the
Maryland statute obviates the need for taking
judicial notice):
[I]n future cases ... , a court could properly
take judicial notice of the general

But see Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not
Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631,644-45 (advocating giving a much more conservative figure as to
the probability of a non-match than has been given in some cases, or using "a phrase such as
'very highly probable,' without quantification").
5
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acceptability of the general theory and the
use of these specific [DNA] techniques.
Beyond such judicial notice [in Maryland,
statutory recognition], the threshold for
admissibility should require only a
preliminary showing of reliability of the
particular data to be offered, i.e., some
indication of how the laboratory work was
done and what analysis and assumptions
underlie the probability calculations. The
probability data may well vary among
different segments of the population.
Affidavits should normally suffice to
provide a sufficient basis for admissibility.
DNA profiling evidence should be excluded
only when the government cannot show this
threshold level of reliability in its data. The
district court should focus on whether
accepted protocol was adequately followed
in a specific case, but the court, in exercising
its discretion, should be mindful that this
issue should go more to the weight than to
the admissibility of the evidence. Rarely
should such a factual determination be
excluded from jury consideration. With
adequate cautionary instructions from the
trial judge, vigorous cross-examination of
the government's experts, and challenging
testimony from defense experts, the jury
should be allowed to make its own factual
determination as to whether the evidence is
reliable.

United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791-800
(2d Cir. 1992). Accord United States v. Martinez, 3
F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993) (post-Daubert). See
United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th
Cir. 1996) (laboratory error may form the basis of
evidence exclusion only when a reliable
methodology was so altered by the laboratory as to
skew the methodology itself) (cited with approval in
United States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658, 664 (D.
Md.2009).
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(b)

PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction)
DNA testing using the PCR technique or
any non-RFLP technique must be evaluated
under Frye-Reed. Armstead; Wagner v. State, 160
Md. App. 531, 542-52, 864 A.2d 1037 (2005) (no
error in finding that mitochondrial DNA (mt
DNA) met Frye-Reed test; potential for
contamination went only to weight of the evidence
and did not make it inadmissible); Chase v. State,
120 Md. App. 141, 153, 706 A.2d 613 (1998) (PCR
evidence passed Frye-Reed test). See United
States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658 (D. Md. 2009)
(DNA evidence based on PCR, which generally
requires sample of at least 100 picograms, is
generally accepted as reliable).

(c)

Need for Contextual Statements
In light of the advances made in DNA
analysis since Armstead was decided in 1996, the
Court of Appeals held in 2005 that "when a DNA
method [here PCR]6 analyzes genetic markers at
sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitestimal
random match probability, expert opinion
testimony of a match and of the source of the
DNA evidence is admissible," Young v. State, 388
Md. 99, 100,879 A.2d 44 (2005), and "the expert
is not required to accompany his 'match'
testimony with contextual statistics." !d. at 105.
In Young, the trial court had committed no error in
admitting expert testimony, following an analysis of
13 loci, that to "a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty (in the absence of an identical twin)" the
defendant was the source of the analyzed DNA. Id.
at 103. Judge Raker, writing for a unanimous court,
noted, however, that if the accused has a close
relative, "typically" a sibling, "who could have been

6 Although Young involved PCR evidence, the defendant did not challenge its admission
on the ground that it failed Frye-Reed nor did the Court of Appeals address that issue. 388 Md.
at 108 n.6.
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the source of the DNA evidence," because he or she
is "in the pool of potential contributors of crime
scene evidence," then "the expert's caveat should
take into account the higher random match
probability for close relatives, not only identical
twins." !d. at 120 n.12.
iii.

Dog Tracking In, But Does Frye Apply?
Compare Clark v. State, 140 Md. App. 540, 578-79,
781 A.2d 913 (2001) (tracking by adequately trained dogs
meets Frye-Reed) with State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312,
1319-20 (Ariz. 1984) (evidence admissible, but Frye
inapplicable, as evidence "was not bottomed on any
scientific theory"). See Johnson v. State, 408 Md. 204, 223
& n.5, 969 A.2d 262 (2009) (evidence that dog trained to
find drugs alerted to defendant's pants was properly
admitted) (not mentioning Frye-Reed).

iv.

PIP Statute: Frye Does Not Apply

The Court of Appeals has held that PIP (Personal
Injury Protection) benefits should be available if medical
techniques are shown to have "efficacious material value
... as a diagnostic aid"; agreement by a majority of the
medical or academic community is not required). Saba tier
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 592 A.2d
1098 (1991).

v.

Repressed Memory: Yes, Frye Applies
The Court of Appeals used the Frye-Reed test in
concluding that "repressed memory" was insufficiently
distinguishable from mere forgetting so as to toll an
otherwise applicable statute oflimitations. Doe v. Maskell,
342 Md. 684, 694, 679 A.2d 1087 (1996) ("While the
existence of consensus (or lack thereof) in the scientific
community is a more familiar inquiry within the context of
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence under
the test enunciated in Reed, it is also a useful measure for
this court to evaluate the acceptance, and acceptability of a
scientific theory.").
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Questions
13.

A clinical social worker wishes to testifY that an alleged victim of child sexual abuse is
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of being sexual abused.
Is the evidence ofPTSD subject to Frye-Reed?
A.

Yes.

B.

No.

See Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480,495 n.10, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995).
14.

In 13., may the psychiatrist testifY to her conclusion that the victim was sexually abused
and was not "faking" her symptoms?

A.

Yes.

B.

No.

Hutton. See Hall v. State, 107 Md. App. 684, 670 A.2d 962 (1996).
See also, e.g., United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 962 (U.S. 2009) (no abuse of discretion to admit child abuse expert's
testimony regarding age-appropriate sexual behavior, delayed reporting, and child
pornography as a form of child abuse).
15.

To impeach the victim's identification, a psychologist is called by the criminal defendant
to testifY to the frailties of eyewitness identification, particularly cross-racial
identification. The defendant is well known to the victim, and there is physical evidence
placing the defendant at the crime scene. Is the evidence subject to Frye-Reed?
A.

Yes.

B.

No.

Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184 (512 A.2d 1056 (1986).
16.

In 15., would you admit the evidence?

A.

Yes.

B.

No.
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See Bomas v. State, 181 Md. App. 204,956 A.2d 215 (2008), cert. granted, 406 Md. 743,
962 A.2d 370 (2008) (if Bloodsworth's test is to be altered, it must be by the Court of
Appeals; in instant case, no abuse of discretion in excluding defense expert's testimony
regarding memory curve and eyewitness identification, where court found expert's
opinion not helpful regarding particular police witness); Thompson v. State, 167 Md.
App. 513,526-27,893 A.2d 1169 (2006).

3.

The $128,000 Question: What Standard for Expert Testimony Applies
in Maryland When Frye Does Not Apply?
a.

Daubert (aJk/a 401-702-403)
In 1993 the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) in
which it held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye

with regard to the admission of scientific evidence. The Court set
forth a number of criteria that a trial court ought consider in
exercising its gatekeeping function to exclude unreliable, "junk
science" so as to admit only reliable expert testimony on scientific
matters. In its 1999 decision in Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court made clear that this responsibility
of the district court applies equally to all proffered expert
testimony, including opinions on non-scientific matters,
"technical" matters, or "other specialized knowledge."
i.

Federal Cases Pre-Daubert

Prior to Daubert, the federal courts were divided as
to what standard applied with regard to proof of reliability
of the principle or technique underlying scientific evidence,
if judicial notice of that principle or technique was
inappropriate. Some adhered to the Frye test. Others had
rejected the Frye test in favor of an ad hoc Fed. R. Evid.
401-702-403 balancing. E.g., United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Unless an exaggerated popular
opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its
use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to
admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as
other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked
by cross-examination and refutation."). These latter courts
applied the general relevance standard of Fed. R. Evid.
401, coupled with Fed. R. Evid. 702's admonition that
any expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.
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Then the trial court must consider Fed. R. Evid. 403: if
the helpful, probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the considerations of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading or
distraction of the trier of fact, or waste of time, the trial
court, in its discretion, should exclude the evidence.

ii.

Daubert
In Daubert the United States Supreme Court joined

this 401-702-403 camp. The Court held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence rejected Frye, although the degree of
acceptance of a particular method or test within the
scientific community remains a relevant factor for the trial
court to consider in performance of its limited "gatekeeping
role" to keep out junk science. The Court declined to set
forth a "definitive" test for the admission of novel scientific
evidence pursuant to its "reliability approach," 509 U.S.
at 595 n.12, but offered the following "general
observations. "
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. * * *
Another pertinent consideration is whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication. Publication (which is but
one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of
admissibility.... * * * Additionally, in the case of
a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily
should consider the known or potential rate of error.
. .. Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a
bearing on the inquiry. A "reliability assessment
does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and
an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within that community." Widespread
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible, and "a known
technique that has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community," may properly be
viewed with skepticism.
27

Id. at 593-94.
The DaubertlKumho Tire 401-702-403 approach is
more flexible and, on its face, more liberal than Frye, as
the Daubert Court relies not on a strict rule of preclusion of
evidence, but on "the adversary system": "Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." Id. at 596.
Yet it does not permit the introduction of
evidence unless the supporting proof suffices "to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position [taken]
more likely than not is true.... " Id. For example, on
remand the Daubert court reached the same conclusion it
had reached when it erroneously had applied Frye: it found
the plaintiff s proffered evidence that Bendectin, an antinausea drug prescribed during pregnancy, had caused
severe birth defects, and again granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment.
The flexibility ofthe Daubert test also could permit
a court to exclude scientific evidence that while still
"generally accepted," has begun to be proved umeliable.
All in all, Daubert has engendered thorough pretrial vetting
by federal judges of proffered expert testimony in every
field. As explained by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit:
A district court considering the admissibility of
expert testimony exercises a gate keeping
function to assess whether the proffered evidence
is sufficiently reliable and relevant. The inquiry
to be undertaken by the district court is "a
flexible one" focusing on the "principles and
methodology" employed by the expert, not on the
conclusions reached. In making its initial
determination of whether proffered testimony is
sufficiently reliable, the court has broad latitude to
consider whatever factors bearing on validity that
the court finds to be useful; the particular factors
will depend upon the unique circumstances of the
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expert testimony involved. The court, however,
should be conscious of two guiding, and sometimes
competing, principles. On the one hand, the court
should be mindful that Rule 702 was intended to
liberalize the introduction of relevant expert
evidence. And, the court need not determine
that the expert testimony a litigant seeks to offer
into evidence is irrefutable or certainly correct.
As with all other admissible evidence, expert
testimony is subject to being tested by "[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof." On the other hand, the court must
recognize that due to the difficulty of evaluating
their testimony, expert witnesses have the
potential to "be both powerful and quite
misleading." And, given the potential
persuasiveness of expert testimony, proffered
evidence that has a greater potential to mislead than
to enlighten should be excluded.

Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257,261 (4th
Cir. 1999) (no error in admitting doctor's testimony)
(citations and footnote omitted).
The specific factors listed in Daubert may not
always be useful to the relevance-reliability-unfair
prejudice analysis. See First Tennessee Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n
v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319, 331-35 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e
find the Daubert reliability factors unhelpful in the present
case, which involves expert testimony derived largely from
Iorlano's own practical experiences throughout forty years
in the banking industry.").
b.

When Frye Does Not Apply, Maryland Essentially Follows
Daubert (5-401 Relevance - 5-702 Reliability - 5-403
Discretion)

See generally Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Importance of
Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 215, 218 (2006)
("[A]1though its judicial adherents tout Frye as a rigorous,
conservative admissibility standard, the standard is severely
cabined and applies to only a limited range of expert testimony.
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The proponent of expert evidence can escape Frye scrutiny if he or
she can convince the trial judge that: (1) the expert is relying on a
traditional theory or technique; (2) the expert is offering soft
scientific testimony; or (3) the witness's expertise is non-scientific
in character. If the trial judge finds that any of these contentions
applies in the pending case, the judge will not subject the expert's
testimony to the general acceptance test.).
4.

Just Curious: Even When Frye Applies, Are the Results Different
under Daubert?
The answer is sometimes, but certainly not always. One would
expect to find less consistency among Daubert cases on the same topic as
there is in a Frye jurisdiction. But when there is disagreement among the
scientific community, there generally will be disagreement emerging under
either Daubert or Frye. Some examples of comparisons follow.
a.

Ballistics and Bullets: Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis
(CBLA): Maryland Out under Frye, Federal In under Daubert
i.

Background
In September 2005 the F .B.I. announced it had

stopped performing CBLA for economic reasons but said it
"still firmly supports the scientific foundation" of CBLA,
the reliability of which a National Academy of Sciences
report had questioned. Julie Bykowicz, FBI Lab Scraps
Gunfire Residue, THE BALT. SUN, lA, col. 6, May 26,
2006.
ii.

Maryland
See Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 896 A.2d 1059
(2006) (reversible error to admit testimony concerning
CBLA of bullets fired at victim and bullets recovered
during traffic stop of defendant; CBLA does not pass FryeReed, as "a genuine controversy [now] exists within the
relevant scientific community about the reliability and
validity of CBLA").

iii.

Federal
United States v. Mikos, 539 F.3d 706, 710-12 (7th
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•
Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion in pennitting FBI
ballistics agent to testify to CBLA), aff'g 2003 WL
22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

See also United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 52526 (5th Cir. 2004) (widespread acceptance by federal courts
of fireanns comparison testing, here of spent shell casings
with known weapon); United States v. Foster, 300
F.Supp.2d 375 (D. Md. 2004) (FBI examiner's comparison
of spent cartridge casings from two murders, when no
known weapon found, admissible). But see infra
V.B.4.c.iii, pp. 34-35 (cases limiting testimony as to
certainty of match).
b.

Field Sobriety Tests: HGN Passes Frye, But Fails Daubert

i.

Maryland: HGN (Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test for
Intoxication) Passes Frye
State v. Blackwell, 408 Md. 677, 971 A.2d 296
(2009) (HGN test, unlike other field sobriety tests, is a
scientific test; reversible error to pennit trooper who
administered it to motorist without expressly ruling trooper
to be an expert) (over well-reasoned dissent of Murphy, J.,
regarding need for express ruling); Schultz v. State, 106
Md. App. 145, 164-65,664 A.2d 60 (1995) (HGN test is a
scientific test and meets Frye-Reed). But cf Crampton v.
State, 71 Md. App. 375, 386-88, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987)
("The Frye-Reed test does not apply to ... field sobriety
tests [the one-leg stand; heel-to-toe; and recitation of
alphabet given by police officers] because the latter are
essentially empirical observations, involving no
controversial, new, or 'scientific' technique. Their use is
guided by practical experience, not theory."), aff'd on other
ground, 314 Md. 265, 550 A.2d 693 (1988).

ii.

Federal: HGN fails Daubert
United States v. Horn, 185 F.Supp.2d 530 (D. Md.
2002) (Daubert applies; arresting officer could not refer, at
trial on merits (as opposed to probable cause issue) to field
sobriety tests-''walk and tum," "one leg stand," and
"horizontal gaze nystagmus"-as tests, as they fail to meet
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Daubert standards when offered to prove blood alcohol,
content; officer could testify to observations; "In so doing,
however, the officer may not use value-added descriptive
language to characterize the subject's performance of the
SFSTs, such as saying that the subject 'failed the test' or
'exhibited' a certain number of 'standardized clues' during
the test"). See United States v. Van Hazel, 468 F.Supp.2d
792, 795-97 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (rejecting Horn's reasoning
but excluding results altogether ofHGN test, as a
"scientific test" which required evidence of test's
reliability, judicial notice being inappropriate).
c.

Fingerprint Evidence: In Flux?
i.

National Academy ofSciences Report
A 2009 National Academy of Sciences' National
Research Council report has fueled the attack on
admissibility of all forensic evidence, such as fingerprints,
hair analysis, bite marks, and handwriting analysis, other
than DNA, when used to identify an individual as well as
weapons' tool marks. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD S-17
(prepUblication Copy Feb. 2009) ("[B]ecause forensic
scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer
a partiCUlar question related to the issues of a particular
case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate
methodology for the sake of expediency.") (cited in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (U.S. Jun.
25,2009).

ii.

Maryland
In Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 86, 40 A.2d 239
(1944), the Court of Appeals took "judicial notice of the
fact that the use of fingerprints is an infallible means of
identification. "

More recently, the reliability of identification based
on partial or "latent" prints has been questioned. Attracting
national attention, Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge
Susan M. Souder ruled in October 2007 that the
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"

,

prosecution's experts could not testify at all regarding the
ACE-V methodology when applied to partial "latent"
prints. State v. Rose (No. K06-0545) (BaIt. Co. Cir. Ct.,
Oct. 19,2007). In light of the proven occurrence of "false
positives" in other cases, Judge Souder found that the State
expert's proffered testimony, that "there is no error rate for
ACE-V" and that he was 100% certain that the latent prints
were the defendant's was "not credible" and his entire
testimony was inadmissible (though she demurred that,
because "ACE-V methodology is changing," ACE-V
evidence might be admissible in the future). Id. at 25. She
seemed to apply a Daubert analysis rather than Frye-Reed,
as she did not specifically find that the defense had proven
that latent fingerprint analysis had lost general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community.
Excluding all of the fingerprint evidence precluded
the jury from learning that the partial prints matched the
defendant's known, rolled prints on at least several Galton
points and did not exclude the defendant as having been at
the scene. After Judge Souder reaffinned her ruling, the
State felt it could not go forward with the case, and the U.S.
Attorney stepped in to consider pursuing a federal
prosecution. See McMenamin,
Eyeing County Case,
THEBALT. SUN, IB, col. 2, Feb. 21, 2008.

u.s.

Since Judge Souder's opinion, at least two
Maryland trial judges have declined to follow it: Judge
Patrick Cavanaugh of Baltimore County Circuit Court,
McMenamin, Judge Rejects Request to Toss Out
Fingerprints, THE BALT. SUN, 4B, col. 2, Nov. 1,2007, and
Judge Dennis M. Sweeney of Howard County. State v.
Johnson (No. 13-K-07-47I08) (Howard Co. Cir. Ct., Mar.
26,2008).
The State's witness in the Howard County case
proffered that "he was able to fonn an opinion within a
reasonable degree of certainty as to the identity of the
person that left the latent print. ... " Id. at 11. Judge
Sweeney held that he would pennit the expert to testify that
he had found a close or exact "match" between the
defendant's known print and the partial latent print, but not
that "no other person in the world's print could also match
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the latents," as "currently validated science" does not go
that far. !d. at 21-23. The court held that the defense was
free to cross examine as to the "alleged flaws" in the ACEV method, as well as to call its own expert. !d. at 23-24.

iii.

Federal: Admissible . ..
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was upheld, against a Daubert challenge, the
admission of expert testimony regarding both fingerprints
and handwriting. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261
(4th Cir. 2003). The majority of the panel found the
reliability of the science of fingerprinting so well
established that it need not be proved "every time opinion
evidence is offered." Id. at 268. Accord United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (testimony of
qualified expert regarding latent fingerprints was properly
admitted, but court committed harmless error in taking
judicial notice that "human friction ridges are unique and
permanent throughout the area of the friction ridge skin,
including small friction ridge areas, and that human friction
ridge skin arrangements are unique and permanent," as
matter was subject to reasonable dispute); United States v.
George, 363 F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2004) (FBI
fingerprint examiner's testimony regarding partial prints
was properly admitted); United States v. Sullivan, 246
F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (ACE-V methodology for
fingerprinting, as practiced by F.B.I., satisfied Daubert).
But see United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 492,
57 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 983 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn
from F. Supp), vacated & superseded, 188 F.Supp.2d 599
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (initially excluding opinion that fingerprint
came from a particular person).
The National Academy Report, however, may
influence more courts to preclude absolutely positive
"match" testimony, as did Judge Sweeney, and as have
federal courts in other areas than fingerprints. United
States V. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658 (D. Md. 2009) (ruling
admissible evidence regarding an initial match achieved by
a "cold hit" from a DNA database when expressed as to
rarity ofthe profile, rather than as random match
probability, absent consensus as to the most reliable
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statistical methodology to be applied); United States v.
Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (prosecutor's
ballistics expert would be limited to opining only that a
firearms match was "more likely than not"); United States
v. Green, 405 F.Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005) (detective
could testify about shell casings, but not that they matched
gun in question "to the exclusion of every other firearm in
the world"); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.
Mass. 1999) (concluding that expert can testify to
similarities or dissimilarities between handwriting samples
but not render identification).
d.

Medical Opinions that Have Been Excluded Under Daubert
A number of the federal "bottom-line" results as to
admissibility seem consistent with those reached in Maryland. See,
e.g., Attorney General o/Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d
769, 780 (10th Cir. 2009) (no abuse of discretion in disregarding,
on ground it was unreliable, testimony of state's experts who
opined that they identified poultry litter DNA in waters of
lllinois River Watershed; trial court properly applied Daubert's
factors, including lack of peer review, because "when experts
employ established methods in their usual manner, a district court
need not take issue under Daubert; however, where established
methods are employed in new ways, a district court may require
further indications of reliability"); Henricksen v. Conocophillips
Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (excluding, as
unreliable, experts' testimony regarding causal link between
tanker driver's exposure to gasoline and his acute myelogenous
leukemia (AML); Gross v. King David Bistro, Inc., 83 F.Supp.2d
597 (D. Md. 2000) (absent close temporal connection or scientific
studies supporting expert's opinion that infection with shigella
sonnei caused fibromyalgia, opinion was too unreliable to admit).

e.

Polygraph: Out in Maryland, Sometimes In in Federal
i.

Maryland: Inadmissible
Maryland excludes polygraph evidence as unreliable
when offered to prove truthfulness or untruthfulness. E.g.,
State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270,275,604 A.2d 489 (1992);
Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 418 A.2d 217 (1980)
(improper to allow witness to testify to opinion as to truth
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and veracity, based on polygraph exam); Oliver v. State, 53
Md. App. 490,496-97,545 A.2d 856 (1983) (rejecting
evidence offered by defendant that prosecution witness
refused to submit to polygraph examination).
In 1998 the United States Supreme Court upheld

Military Rule of Evidence 707, which, like Maryland case
law, per se precludes the admission of polygraph evidence,
as not violative of a court martial defendant's Fifth or Sixth
Amendment rights to present a defense. United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). Four concurring justices
suggested, however, that a per se rule of exclusion is not
"wise." Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). Justice Stevens dissented.
ii.

Federal: Court May Have Some Discretion
E.g., United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1196 (10th Cir. 2006) (no abuse of discretion in excluding
evidence that confidential informant took two polygraph
tests and failed one, on ground that even if evidence
satisfied Daubert, it was properly excluded for Fed. R.
Evid. 403 reasons); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520,
1536 n.1O (11th Cir. 1996) ("[p]olygraph evidence may
be admitted to impeach or corroborate testimony of a
witness at trial within the court's discretion, so long as
the opposing party has adequate notice of the evidence and
an opportunity to secure its own polygraph.").

But the majority of a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has concluded that,
due to post-Daubert decisions of that court, only an en banc
decision could overrule the circuit's per se rule of
inadmissibility of polygraph evidence. United States v.
Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.3d 494, 497-501 (4th Cir. 2003).
Judge Hamilton, dissenting, would have reversed and
remanded the case to give the defendant the opportunity to
show that his polygraph evidence was admissible under
Daubert. See also United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174,
186 (4th Cir. 1981 ) (admission of polygraph evidence may
be proper, especially if requested by defense rather than by
prosecution, and if a nonjury trial), opinion modified, 669
F.2d 185 (4thCir.1982).
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f.

Voiceprint:Maryland Out, Federal Ma~e In
i.

Maryland
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 383, 391 A.2d 364,371
(1978) (applying Frye and holding voiceprint
inadmissible).

ii.

Federal
See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th
Cir. 1975) (no abuse of discretion in admitting) (citing
conflicting federal decisions).

5.

Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Better Approach?
Is there a better way? One possibility for a compromise
modification of Frye-Reed is that adopted by the Uniform Law
Commissioners. U.R.E. 702 (1999) uses Frye as the initial test, but a
party dissatisfied with the result under Frye may challenge it by relying on
the Daubert factors to prove that it is "more probable than not that the
principle or method" is reasonably reliable (or not).

See Myrna Raeder, Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, AALS Evidence Section Newsletter, 2-3, Spring 1998 ("This
proposal was believed to give judges the benefit of relying on the scientific
community at the outset, while still giving the adverse litigant the
opportunity to demonstrate the actual reliability or unreliability of the
principle or methodology in question. Ultimately, a rule codifying
Daubert was viewed as requiring the judge to make a reliability
determination in virtually every case, while this hybrid standard
would both cut down the amount of challenges and also reestablish
the judge's ability to rely on the scientific community until challenged,
rather than requiring an independent evaluation of reliability from the
outset.").
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